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REAL PROPORTY - RIGHTS OF A GRANTEE FROM AN
IMPROVING GRANTOR IN PARTITION
Plaintiff, the grantee of an improving contenant, claims that a lien
on the land for improvements passes to her through the deed as against
the trustee in bankruptcy for the other cotenant. Held; the deed does
not pass to the grantee any lien or equitable claim against the common
property, or on the proceeds of the sale of the estate partitioned, for the
improvements made by the grantor.'
In order for the grantee to recover in this action she would have to
show that the grantor had a lien or an equitable charge on the premises
for improvements made, and this passed with the deed.2 As a general
proposition a tenant-in-common has the right to improve the property,
but does not have the right to compel contribution from his cotenants
unless they have assented to these improvements.' But the improving
tenant-in-common may bring partition proceedings,4 and the amount
and manner of recovery are in the discretion of the court. At common
law, the improving cotenant had no means of recovery other than in
equity for partition, and could not sue his cotenant at law for improve-
ments or repairs made.
There are four usual approaches in partition proceedings to protect
the improving party; first, if it is possible, the court will allot the im-
proved portion of the property to the improving cotenant;' second, an
assignment to the improving cotenant of increased proportion of the land
to cover the amount of the share of the other cotenant, had he contrib-
uted;' third, when partition can not be had satisfactorily and a sale is
necessary, the improving cotenant will be reimbursed from the proceeds
of the sale; and his reimbursement will be gauged not by his cost, but
by the amount which the improvement enhances the value at the sale; 7
1 Russell v. Russell, 63 Ohio App. 33 (1939).
2A grantee of a cotenant has no better right against other contenants than had his
grantor. Gill v. O'Neil, zz5 Ala. 92, 142 So. 397, 8S A.L.R. a526 (1932).
a "Where one of several cotenants made improvements on the common property with-
out the consent of the others neither the property nor his cotenants are chargeable as a
matter of right with their value, or the expenses incurred in making them." 7 R.C.L. 833,
"Cotenancy" section 33. Also see 6z C.J. 403, at 481, section Izz, I23. Also see 14
American Jurisprudence x 15, "Cotenancy" section 49-
'Right of a tenant in common to compensation for improvements made on the joint
property is not absolute and will be decreed only where circumstances make it equitable to
do so in light of interests of other tenants. Summers v. Satterfield, 196 S.E. 159, 122
A.L.R. 229 (1938).
'Roberts v. Roberts, 278 S.W. 937 (Texas Civ. App., 1925).
'Adjustment on Partition of Improvements Made by Tenant in Common, i A.L.R.
ii89, at 1202.
"Ward v. Ward Heirs, 40 W.Va. 61 , 21 S.E. 746, 29 L.R.A. 499, 5z Am. St. Rep.
9z1 (1895). Kessler v. Smith, (New Jersey) 128 Atl. 598 (1924).
fourth, compensation by the cotenant who receives the improved prop-
erty as a result of the partition proceedings.'
It has been said that the improving cotenant does not have anything
comparable to a lien' on the property for the improvements, but merely
an equitable claim which will be adjusted as well as possible by the court
in partition proceedings. In the principal case, the grantor had no lien
and so none could pass to his grantee, by reason of the deed. From the
court's approach, the improving grantor may have had an equitable
claim which he himself could have enforced in partition proceedings but
this did not pass to his grantee. The court holds that this equitable claim
could have passed to the grantee but the deed must state in express terms
that the improvements are included in the estate conveyed. However, it
is submitted that the grantee should be in as good a position as the im-
proving grantor, that is, he should have an equitable claim to be adjusted
in partition proceedings in one of the above mentioned ways, unless
there is something in the transaction which negatives the transfer of the
improving tenant's equity. Whether or not this claim did pass should be
resolved ultimately by the intentions of the parties to the transaction, and
not by the court determining if the deed purported in terms to convey
the improvements.
It is interesting to note the disposition made by the court of the
inchoate right of dower of the wife of the bankrupt. The court cites 30
Ohio Jurisprudence, 931, sec. I 14 for the proposition that in a partition
action, an inchoate right of dower in an undivided interest is replaced by
a right of dower in the proceeds as against the creditors of the consort;
or as against trustee for such creditors. This permits a partition action or
a sale of the premises without the consent of the spouse. It would seem
that this is a proper disposition of the dower interest, but the Ohio
Supreme Court has held that in partition proceedings the wife's dower
""Where it appears that an allotment of the improved portion to the improving tenant
in partition in kind is not equitable or practicable, the improving tenant should be allowed
rva onable compensation from those who receive the benefits." Adjustment on Partition
of Improvements Made by Tenant in Common, izz A.L.R. 234. Also see Clarke v.
Clarke, IS3 N.E. 13, 349 Ill. 642 (1932).
, But note, a tenant in common, placing improvements on the common property with
the express assent of his cotenant, acquires a lien on his cotenant's interest for a propor-
tionate hare of the cost of improvements. Baird v. Jackson, 98 Ill. 78 (88s) ; also see
Houston v. McClurey, 8 W.Va. 135 (1874).
A cotenant has been held to have a lien on the premises when she paid off a mortgage
on the common property in order to save her estate. And this lien may be enforced in an
action for an accounting, or as an allowance upon partition, or by separate actions for
contribution. Weisner v. Wilson, 197 N.W. 6o8, 228 Wis. Sox (1938).
Also a tenant in common who pays the entire amount of taxes due on the common
property has a right of contribution from the cotenant in proportion to their share of the
e- tate.
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interest in divested and she has apparently no right in the proceeds as
against her husband." J.W.L.
THE NATURE OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS- ENFORCEMENT
BY COVENANTEE WHO No LONGER OwNs LAND
IN THE COMMUNITY
A recent Ohio decision' involves the nature of restrictive covenants
and the theories of their enforcement. A corner lot which had been
part of a testamentary estate was transferred by a deed containing a re-
strictive clause forbidding the use of the premises for other than residence
purposes. The restriction was stated to be for the benefit of certain
named devisees and also to and for the benefit of the present and future
owners of the real estate which the testator had owned on a particular
street. An owner of property on the adjoining street joined with one of
the named covenantees in seeking to enforce the covenant by injunc-
tion against a successor in title to the lot in question. Enforcement was
denied on the grounds that no one on the designated street was objecting
and that the covenantee who no longer owned land in the community
would not "benefit" from enforcement of the restriction.
The character of the remedy sought indicates that the theory of the
plaintiff's case was based on equity doctrines. A substantial reason for
appealing to equitable jurisdiction is the specific nature of the remedy
which equity affords. More often than not the party seeking to enforce
a restrictive covenant is more interested in insuring the continuance of
the limitation than in obtaining monetary compensation. Such a desire
has been especially evident in the field of building restrictions in the de-
velopment of residential subdivision plans and recourse to equity has been
most frequent in this area.
When there is an attempt to enforce covenants by and against suc-
cessors to the original covenating parties there are further advantages
in the equitable approach. Many of the strict and rigid requirements,2
like the necessity of privity, which were incident to the common law
devices of easements and real covenants are relaxed or avoided in equity.
The leading case' using the equity approach made the equitable doctrine
"o Weaver v. Gregg, 6 Ohio St. 547, 67 Am. Dec. 355 (1856). Also see Long v.
Long, 99 Ohio St. 330, 124 N.E. 161, 5 A.L.R. 1343 (197o). Also see TIFFANY, REAL
PROPERTY, 7d ed., vol. 1, sec. 230, p. 8oi.
' Taylor v. Summit Post No. ig, American Legion, Inc., 6o Ohio App. 201, Z7 Ohio
L. Abs. 58z, 13 Ohio Op. 25, 20 N.E. (zd) 267 (938).
2Hurd v. Curtis, ig Pick. (Mass.) 459 (1837) 5 Burbank v. Pillsbury, 48 N.H. 475,
97 Am. Dec. 633 (1869); Lingle Water Users' Assn v. Occidental Bldg and Loan Assn,
4.3 WyO. 41, 297 Pac. 385 (1931); note (1937) 4 O.S.L.J. 93; z TIFFANY, REAL PROP-
ERTY, (2d Ed., sgo) sec. .4 (d).
' Talk v. Moxhay, 2 Phil. (Eng. Ch.) 774 (1848).
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